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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This Article is a tribute to Professor Gabriel M. Wilner.  As a true citizen 
of the world, and concerned about its future, Professor Wilner dedicated 
himself to international development and to improving international 
economic and social justice.  For all of us who had the honor of participating 
in Professor Wilner’s seminars on the law of international economic 
development in the LL.M. Program on International Legal Cooperation at the 
Vrije Universiteit Brussel—where he taught from 1976 to 2004—his 
commitment to the progressive development of international law will remain 
an inspiration.  As a teacher, Professor Wilner worked in the tradition of his 
Columbia Law School mentor, Wolfgang Friedmann, with whom he had 
collaborated on parts of the landmark book The Changing Structure of 
International Law.1  A proponent of the “law in context” approach, Professor 
Wilner’s seminars constituted an eye-opener to the global economic and 
political sea changes of the time and their impact on the development of 
world law.  Thanks to a wealth of experience as former member of the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs, former Legal Officer at the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), and legal consultant at the UN Commission 
on Transnational Corporations, Professor Wilner brought to the classroom a 
unique insight into the law and diplomacy of international economic 
relations. 
Professor Wilner’s influence on his students at the Vrije Universiteit 
Brussel went well beyond the field of international law.  Year after year, he 
motivated and assisted students to become active members of the 
transatlantic community and to continue their education in the United States.  
In the same spirit, and in his capacity as Associate Dean of Graduate Legal 
Studies at the University of Georgia School of Law, he offered young 
colleagues at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel the unique opportunity of 
teaching European Union (EU) law in Athens, Georgia, while also inviting 
them to join the faculty of his long-running Brussels Seminar on the Law and 
Policy of the EU.  All those who—like myself—have benefited from these 
opportunities, owe Professor Wilner a great debt of gratitude.  As a 
warmhearted teacher and mentor, generous friend, and great humanist, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1964).  
Professor Wilner was also the principal editor of a volume of essays in honor of Professor 
Friedmann, JUS ET SOCIETAS: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN (Gabriel M. 
Wilner ed., 1979). 
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Professor Wilner’s memory will live among the generations of students and 
colleagues on all continents whom he motivated, helped, and inspired. 
In light of Professor Wilner’s longstanding interest and teaching activities 
in EU law, and his concentration on international economic relations, this 
Article will focus on the EU’s international trade competences after the 
Treaty of Lisbon.2  The EU’s external trade policy, or common commercial 
policy (CCP) as it is called in the EU’s Treaty language, belongs to the EU’s 
exclusive competences.3  However, its precise scope has been the subject of 
a decades-long legal and political debate.4  The main causes of this 
seemingly endless discussion have been: (a) the poor drafting of the original 
EEC Treaty Article on the CCP;5 (b) the decades of resistance by the 
Member States to accept the EU as a single actor in international trade that is 
empowered to conclude comprehensive and modern international trade 
                                                                                                                   
 2 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing 
the European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1 [hereinafter Lisbon Treaty].  
To obtain a full picture of the currently applicable EU primary law, consult the Consolidated 
Version of the Treaty on European Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter 
TEU], and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].  
 3 See infra Part II.  The numbering of the relevant Treaty Article on the CCP has changed 
over time.  The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty], incorporated the CCP competences and procedures in 
its Article 113.  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on 
European Union and the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related 
Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam], the original 
Article 113 was renumbered as Article 133 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 173 [hereinafter EC 
Treaty (Amsterdam)].  With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, supra note 2, Article 
133 was renumbered to Article 207 of TFEU, supra note 2. 
 4 See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, External Relations Powers of the European 
Community, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. S149 (1999) (discussing how poor drafting and 
interpretive problems have led to debate over the common commercial policy provision); see 
also Rafael Leal-Arcas, Is EC Trade Policy up to Par?: A Legal Analysis over Time – Rome 
Marrakesh, Amsterdam, Nice, and the Constitutional Treaty, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 305 
(2007) (providing analysis of the “evolution of the EC’s common commercial policy 
competence” over time). 
 5 See generally Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The Common Commercial Policy—Scope and 
Nature of the Powers, in PROTECTIONISM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1, 3 (E.L.M. Völker 
ed., 1987); Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, The Scope of Article 113 of the EEC Treaty, in ETUDES 
DE DROIT DES COMMUNAUTÉS EUROPÉENNES: MÉLANGES OFFERTS À PIERRE-HENRI TEITGEN 
147 (Philippe Manin et al. eds., 1984); Stephen Woolcock, Trade Policy: A Further Shift 
Towards Brussels, in POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 384 (Helen Wallace et al. eds., 
6th ed. 2010). 
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agreements without the need for separate Member State ratifications;6 and (c) 
the failure of the European Court of Justice to give a logical and coherent 
follow-up to its initial broad definition of the CCP.7  In 1994, Takis Tridimas 
and Piet Eeckhout accurately noted that, although the Court “has made broad 
statements of principle, it has been singularly reluctant to draw from them 
what may seem to be their logical consequences.”8 
The question of the scope of the CCP and its delimitation of competences 
is of constitutional significance for two main reasons.9  First, the EU has 
conferred powers only.10  Before it can conclude an international trade 
agreement, the EU must tie that agreement to its own primary law (i.e., to a 
provision in one of the EU Treaties) that empowers it to approve the 
agreement.11  On several occasions, a restrictive interpretation of the scope of 
the EU’s primary law has resulted in the conclusion that the EU Treaties do 
not confer sufficiently comprehensive competence on the EU to ratify an 
agreement in its entirety.12  As competences not conferred upon the EU in the 
                                                                                                                   
 6 See generally SOPHIE MEUNIER, TRADING VOICES: THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL NEGOTIATIONS (2005); Sophie Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, 
The European Union As a Conflicted Trade Power, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 906 (2006); Sophie 
Meunier & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, The European Union As a Trade Power, in INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 247 (Christopher Hill & Michael Smith eds., 2005) 
[hereinafter The European Union As a Trade Power] (describing the derivation of the EU’s 
inherent power through trade).  
 7 Some commentators have given broader negative opinions on the Court’s jurisprudence 
in the field of the EU´s external relations competences.  See PANOS KOUTRAKOS, EU 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LAW 85 (2006) (“[T]here is something deeply troubling about the 
lack of clarity and consistency of the line of reasoning followed [by the Court in the landmark 
case on implied external powers].”); see also David L. Scannell, Trespassing on Sacred 
Ground: The Implied External Competence of the European Community, 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. 
EUR. L. STUD. 343, 345 (2001) (“[T]he language employed by the Court . . . has not been 
conduceive to legal certainty.”). 
 8 Takis Tridimas & Piet Eeckhout, The External Competence of the Community and the 
Case-Law of the Court of Justice: Principle Versus Pragmatism, 14 Y.B. EUR. L. 143, 172 
(1994). 
 9 This question is analogous to that addressed in the European Court of Justice’s Opinion 
2/00 where it attributed a constitutional significance to the choice of the legal base.  Opinion 
2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5.  
 10 Id.; TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(2). 
 11 Opinion 2/00, para. 5. 
 12 See generally Marise Cremona, Defining Competence in EU External Relations: Lessons 
from the Treaty Reform Process, in LAW AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS: SALIENT 
FEATURES OF A CHANGING LANDSCAPE 34, 38–42 (Alan Dashwood & Marc Maresceau eds., 
2008); Panos Koutrakos, Legal Basis and Delimitation of Competence in EU External 
Relations, in EU FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL FUNDAMENTALS 171–98 (Marise 
Cremona & Bruno de Witte eds., 2008). 
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Treaties remain with the Member States, agreements that come partly under 
the EU´s CCP and partly within the competence of the Member States (so-
called mixed trade agreements) also require the joint ratification of each of 
the Member States.13  The ratification of an agreement by all twenty-seven 
EU Member States, in addition to its conclusion by the EU, is a cumbersome 
process that creates multiple legal problems.14  At this moment, around three 
years typically pass between the signature and the ratification of mixed 
agreements by the EU and its Member States.15  Logically, the European 
Commission—the EU institution charged with promoting the general interest 
of the EU—has argued over the years for a broad interpretation of the CCP 
in order to avoid the complexity of mixed agreements, while the Member 
States, together with the EU’s Council of Ministers, have often insisted on 
remaining directly involved in the conclusion of international trade 
agreements.16 
Second, the competence question has consequences for the EU 
decisionmaking procedure.17  At the negotiation stage of international 
agreements, those agreements that fall under the CCP are negotiated by the 
European Commission as a single actor, working on behalf of the EU as a 
                                                                                                                   
 13 TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(2).  The practice that mixed trade agreements “shall be 
concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States” was explicitly written in the 
Treaty of Nice Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the 
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 (C 80) 1.  The same 
phrase is also found in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European 
Community art. 133(6), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) [hereinafter EC Treaty (Nice)].  
This provision is no longer present in the currently applicable TFEU, supra note 2. 
 14 See generally MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED: THE EU AND ITS MEMBER STATES IN THE 
WORLD (Christophe Hillion & Panos Koutrakos eds., 2010) [hereinafter MIXED AGREEMENTS 
REVISITED] (providing an up-to-date overview of legal questions related to EU mixed 
agreements); MIXED AGREEMENTS (David O’Keeffe & Henry G. Schermers eds., 1983) (the 
landmark study that raised academic attention to the topic of EU mixed agreements in 1983); 
LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE ET LES ACCORDS MIXTES: QUELLES PERSPECTIVES? (Jacques 
H.J. Bourgeois et al. eds., 1997) (providing interesting perspectives by practitioners and 
academics).  
 15 Frank Hoffmeister, Curse or Blessing?  Mixed Agreements in the Recent Practice of the 
European Union and Its Member States, in MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 14, at 
249, 256.  Judge Christiaan Timmermans of the European Court of Justice remarked that 
mixed agreements notably entail the risk “that a Member State might use the necessary 
approval of a mixed agreement as leverage to obtain concessions in other fields.”  Christiaan 
Timmermans, Opening Remarks—Evolution of Mixity Since the Leiden 1982 Conference, in 
MIXED AGREEMENTS REVISITED, supra note 14, at 1, 7.  
 16 See MEUNIER, supra note 6 (providing a detailed study of EU decisionmaking in trade 
policy and the practical cosequences of mixity). 
 17 Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5. 
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whole.18  In the pre-Lisbon Treaty era, multilateral agreements that include 
trade provisions, but also other objectives that fall partly within the shared 
competence of the Member States (such as environmental protection), were 
often negotiated by the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, together with 
the Commission.19  The Treaty of Lisbon now explicitly stipulates that the 
Commission shall ensure the EU’s entire external representation (except for 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy—CFSP).20  This provision can be 
interpreted to include the negotiation of agreements that cover shared 
competences.  Nevertheless, the Member States seem determined to continue 
the practice of having mixed agreements negotiated, at least partly, by the 
Council Presidency.21  
At the conclusion stage of international agreements, the Council of 
Ministers can, in general, act with a qualified majority voting in favor of 
agreements under the CCP, after consultation of the European Parliament or 
after having obtained its consent.22  However, trade agreements of a “mixed” 
nature, involving the shared competences of the Member States, require the 
“common accord of the Member States,” thus preventing majority decision-
taking.23  This is an additional reason that has motivated the European 
Commission to favor a broad interpretation of the CCP’s scope, while the 
Member States have been keen on maintaining their veto right.24 
                                                                                                                   
 18 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(3); Frank Hoffmeister, The Contribution of EU Practice to 
International Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW 37, 49–50 (Marise 
Cremona ed., 2008); The European Union As a Trade Power, supra note 6, at 254–57; 
Woolcock, supra note 5, at 388–89. 
 19 Hoffmeister, supra note 15, at 253–55; see also Hoffmeister, supra note 18, at 53. 
 20 TEU, supra note 2, art. 17(1). 
 21 As shown in the articles cited below, this was illustrated by the difficulties over EU 
representation on international environmental negotiations following the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon.  Jennifer Rankin, Row over Who Gets to Take Charge at Environment Talks, 
EUROPEANVOICE.COM (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/row-
over-who-gets-to-take-charge-at-environment-talks/67677.aspx; Jennifer Rankin, Row over Who 
Provides the EU’s ‘One Voice,’ EUROPEANVOICE.COM (May 20, 2010), http://www.europeanvoi  
ce.com/article/imported/row-over-who-provides-the-eu-s-one-voice-/67997.aspx; Jennifer 
Rankin, Commission Defends Lead Role in International Talks, EUROPEANVOICE.COM (June 24, 
2010), http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/commission-defends-lead-role-in-
international-talks-/68324.aspx; Anne Eckstein, Mercury: Running Battle Between Council and 
Commission, EUROPOLITICS (May 25, 2010), http://www.europolitics.info/sectorial-
policies/mercury-running-battle-between-council-and-commission-art272673-15.html. 
 22 TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 207(3)–(4), 218(6). 
 23 The practice that mixed trade agreements require the common accord of the Member 
States was written into the EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(6).  This provision is no 
longer present in the currently applicable TFEU.  Hoffmeister, supra note 15, at 256–57. 
 24 See supra notes 4, 6 and accompanying text for a variety of cases illustrating this 
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Against this background, the main purpose of this Article is to clarify the 
current state-of-play on the complex question of EU competence in CCP 
matters after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon.  This Article will, at 
the same time, illustrate the gradual and sometimes complex nature of the 
European integration process, even in an area in which the EU and its 
predecessor have already made their marks.  Obviously, the scope and limits 
of the EU’s competences in the field of international trade are of crucial 
importance, including for non-EU countries that want to understand the EU 
as a partner in multilateral and bilateral trade negotiations.25  
II.  THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY AS AN EXCLUSIVE EU 
COMPETENCE 
The limits of the EU’s competences are governed by the principle of 
conferral,26 which means that the EU shall only act within the limits of the 
competences conferred or attributed to it by the Member States in the 
Treaties on which the EU is founded.27 
Through the Treaty of Lisbon, external trade policy—formally called the 
common commercial policy—is conferred on the EU as one of its exclusive 
competences.28  When the EU’s founding Treaties confer on the Union 
exclusive competence in a specific area, only the Union may legislate and 
adopt legally binding acts in that area.29  In these fields, the Member States 
are only able to act if so empowered by the Union or for the implementation 
of Union acts.30 
That the CCP was included in the Lisbon Treaty’s list of exclusive EU 
competences did not come as a surprise.  Already in 1975, the European 
Court of Justice had held that the CCP was an exclusive competence of the 
European Economic Community (EEC)—the EU’s predecessor.31  In 
Opinion 1/75, the Court underlined that the CCP was conceived “for the 
                                                                                                                   
struggle between Commission and Member States. 
 25 This area is increasingly important as the European Commission has recently unveiled a 
particularly ambitious multilateral and bilateral trade policy agenda for the EU.  See Trade, 
Growth and World Affairs: Trade Policy As a Core Component of the EU’s 2020 Strategy, 
at 15, COM (2010) 612 (Nov. 9, 2010). 
 26 TEU, supra note 2, art. 5(1).  
 27 Id. art. 5(2); Opinion 2/00, 2001 E.C.R. I-9713, para. 5. 
 28 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 3. 
 29 Id. art. 2(2). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Opinion 1/75, 1975 E.C.R. 1355, 1365. 
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defense of the common interests of the Community” and stated that the 
exercise of concurrent powers by the Member States and the Community in 
this field was “impossible”: 
To accept that the contrary were true would amount to 
recognizing that, in relations with third countries, Member 
States may adopt positions which differ from those which the 
Community intends to adopt, and would thereby distort the 
institutional framework, call into question the mutual trust 
within the Community and prevent the latter from fulfilling its 
task in the defence of the common interest.32 
The exclusive nature of the CCP is the logical corollary of the customs 
union that was set up by the Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the EEC.33  
As prescribed by Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), customs unions have an internal and an external 
characteristic.34  Internally, customs unions eliminate the duties and other 
restrictive regulations of commerce with respect to substantially all trade 
between the constituent territories of the union.35  Externally, in relations 
with third countries, customs unions apply substantially the same duties and 
other regulations of commerce.36  In the EU, these criteria have been 
interpreted strictly.  This means that, in trade between the EU Member 
States, customs duties on imports and exports, and charges having equivalent 
effect, are prohibited.37  For imports from third countries, the EU has a 
Common Customs Tariff (CCT).38  Individual Member States have lost the 
competence to levy their own customs duties on products that are imported 
from outside the EU.39  For such products from third countries, only the CCT 
applies.  It is fixed by the EU’s Council of Ministers, on a proposal of the 
                                                                                                                   
 32 Id. at 1364. 
 33 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9; TFEU, supra note 2, art. 206. 
 34 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter GATT].  See generally Youri Devuyst & Asja Serdarevic, The World Trade 
Organization and Regional Trade Agreements: Bridging the Constitutional Credibility Gap, 
18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1 (2007) (underlining that the interpretation of GATT art. XXIV 
has been the subject of long-lasting controversy). 
 35 GATT, supra note 34, art. XXIV(8)(a)(i). 
 36 Id. art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii). 
 37 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 30. 
 38 Id. art. 31. 
 39 Id. arts. 2–3, 31. 
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European Commission.40  In addition to the CCT, customs unions also apply 
the same other regulations of commerce to third countries.41  In the EU, this 
application has given rise to the CCP.42 
III.  THE SECTORAL SCOPE OF THE COMMON COMMERCIAL POLICY 
The exclusive nature of the EU’s competence in the CCP has been clear 
and accepted since Opinion 1/75.43  However, its exact scope has been the 
subject of a decades-long legal and political debate that will be reviewed in 
this Part.  
A.  The Treaty of Rome 
The original EEC Treaty did not contain a precise definition of the CCP.  
The relevant Article 113(1) mentioned that the CCP would be based on 
uniform principles, “particularly in regards to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of uniformity in 
measures of liberalization, export policy and measures to protect trade such 
as those to be taken in case of dumping or subsidies.”44  In other words, 
Article 113(1) simply listed examples—in a non-exhaustive manner—of 
measures belonging to the CCP.  Several responsible officials within the EU 
institutions have regretted this rather poor drafting.45  For instance, Claus-
Dieter Ehlermann, then-Director General of the European Commission’s 
Legal Service, lamented that “[m]ore than any other type of power, an 
exclusive power requires a comprehensive definition of its ratio materiae.”46  
Fortunately, the European Court of Justice initially seemed to adopt a broad, 
coherent and comprehensive view of the CCP.47  In Opinion 1/78, it held as 
follows: 
                                                                                                                   
 40 Id. art. 31. 
 41 GATT, supra note 34, art. XXIV(8)(a)(ii). 
 42 TFEU, supra note 2, arts. 3, 207. 
 43 See Opinion 1/78, 1979 E.C.R. 2871, para. 39 (“[The Council recalled] that the exclusive 
nature of Community powers in the matter of commercial policy is not in question.”).  
 44 EEC Treaty, supra note 3, art. 113(1) (emphasis added). 
 45 Bourgeois, supra note 5, at 3; Ehlermann, supra note 5, at 147. 
 46 Ehlermann, supra note 5, at 147. 
 47 PIET EECKHOUT, EXTERNAL RELATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: LEGAL AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS 16–18 (2004); Tridimas & Eeckhout, supra note 8, at 156. 
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 Article 113 empowers the Community to formulate a 
commercial ‘policy’, based on ‘uniform principles’ thus 
showing that the question of external trade must be governed 
from a wide point of view and not only having regard to the 
administration of precise systems such as customs and 
quantitative restrictions.  The same conclusion may be deduced 
from the fact that the enumeration in Article 113 of the subjects 
covered by commercial policy (changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalization, export policy and 
measures to protect trade) is conceived as a non-exhaustive 
enumeration which must not, as such, close the door to the 
application in a Community context of any other process 
intended to regulate external trade.  A restrictive interpretation 
of the concept of common commercial policy would risk 
causing disturbances in intra-Community trade by reason of the 
disparities which would then exist in certain sectors of 
economic relations with non-member countries.48 
B.  Opinion 1/94 
At the end of the Uruguay Round which created the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the EU Member States contested the Community’s 
competence to conclude the Round’s results in the fields of trade in services 
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property protection.49  The Member 
States were determined to protect their own prerogatives in the two latter 
fields and rejected the exclusive competence of the Community.50  The 
dispute ended up before the Court and resulted in Opinion 1/94.51  Nothing 
                                                                                                                   
 48 Opinion 1/78, para. 45. 
 49 Pieter J. Kuijper, The Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the 
European Community, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 222 (1995); Peter L.H. Van den Bossche, The 
European Community and the Uruguay Round Agreements: Confusion and Controversy over the 
Competence and Conduct of the European Community in International Economic Relations, in 
IMPLEMENTING THE URUGUAY ROUND 23 (John H. Jackson & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997). 
 50 Kuijper, supra note 49; Van den Bossche, supra note 49. 
 51 Opinion 1/94 1994, E.C.R., I-5267.  The most interesting critical perspectives on Opinion 
1/94 are EECKHOUT, supra note 47, at 26–34; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, The EC in the WTO and 
Advisory Opinion 1/94: An Echternach Procession, 32 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 763 (1995); 
Nicholas Emiliou, The Death of Exclusive Competence?, 21 EUR. L. REV. 294, 294 (1996); 
Meinhard Hilf, The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO – No Surprise, but Wise?, 6 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 245 (1995); Pierre Pescatore, Opinion 1/94 on “Conclusion” of the WTO Agreement: Is 
2011] THE EU’S INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMPETENCE  649 
 
prevented the Court from adopting a modern and dynamic approach to the 
CCP, from giving a broad interpretation to the Article 113 concepts “the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements” and “the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalization,” and to include—at minimum—the 
full range of trade in services in the CCP.52  Instead, the Court broke with its 
own comprehensive view of the CCP as formulated in Opinion 1/78 and 
came up with a narrow reformulation of its implied external powers doctrine 
to limit the scope of the CCP to the following aspects of the Uruguay 
Round’s Final Act: trade in goods (i.e., the entire GATT);53 cross-frontier 
trade in services, but only where it did not involve any movement of persons, 
thereby excluding from the CCP the important parts of the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) involving consumption abroad, 
commercial presence through a subsidiary or a branch, and presence of 
natural persons abroad;54 and measures taken at the external frontiers of the 
Community regarding the prohibition of the release into free circulation of 
counterfeit goods, excluding practically the entire Uruguay Round’s 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property measures (TRIPs) from 
the CCP.55 
The Court’s Opinion was disappointing from the Commission’s 
perspective because it prevented the simple extension of the traditional 
Community method to the new trade topics.  One of the major drawbacks of 
the Court’s Opinion was that international agreements covering GATS and 
TRIPs required the common accord in the negotiation and ratification by all 
Member States as well as by the Community.56  To nonetheless ensure the 
EU´s unity in international representation, the Court prescribed “close 
cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, 
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfillment of the 
commitments entered into.”57  Recognizing the possible problems that this 
                                                                                                                   
There an Escape from a Programmed Disaster?, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 387 (1999). 
 52 For the state of the legal debate on the scope of the CCP and trade in services before 
Opinion 1/94, see PIET EECKHOUT, THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 22–34 (1994); Paolo Mengozzi, Trade in Services and 
Commercial Policy, in THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S COMMERCIAL POLICY AFTER 1992: THE 
LEGAL DIMENSION 223 (Marc Maresceau ed., 1993); Christiaan Timmermans, Common 
Commercial Policy (Article 113 EEC) and International Trade in Services, in DU DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL AU DROIT DE L’INTÉGRATION 675 (Francesco Capotorti et al. eds., 1987) . 
 53 Opinion 1/94, paras. 22–34. 
 54 Id. paras. 36–53, 73–98. 
 55 Id. paras. 54–71, 99–105. 
 56 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 57 Opinion 1/94, para. 108. 
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could cause in the administration of the WTO Agreement and its annexes, 
and underlining that such concerns were quite legitimate, the Court 
nevertheless stressed that such practical considerations could not influence 
its findings on the allocation of competence.58  
C.  The Treaties of Amsterdam and Nice 
The Commission tried to rectify the situation during the negotiation of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, but the result was meager.59  Article 133(5) 
EC merely created a theoretical possibility for the Council, acting 
unanimously, to extend the application of the CCP procedures to agreements 
on services and intellectual property.60  A more substantial step toward the 
integration of GATS and TRIPs competences in the CCP took place with the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Nice in 2003.61  For Finnish Prime Minister 
Paavo Lipponen, the issue was important: 
The Community used to be a driving force in global trade 
negotiations for many years.  Now over 60% of all trade is in 
the field of services, where the Community does not have 
exclusive competence.  Consequently our status as an effective 
negotiator has declined dramatically.  The Union must re-
establish its position.  We can do this only if we are able to 
agree on the communitarisation of trade in services, intellectual 
property and investments in the ongoing IGC.62 
Still, the final version of the Finnish compromise text that found its way 
into the Treaty of Nice did not lead to a formal extension of the CCP.63  
Rather, it simply allowed the institutional provisions of the CCP to “also 
apply to the negotiation and conclusion of agreements in the fields of trade in 
                                                                                                                   
 58 Id. para. 107. 
 59 Marise Cremona, EC External Commercial Policy After Amsterdam: Authority and 
Interpretation Within Interconnected Legal Orders, in THE EU, THE WTO, AND THE NAFTA: 
TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE? 5 (J.H.H. Weiler ed., 2000); Leal-
Arcas, supra note 4, at 359. 
 60 EC Treaty (Amsterdam), supra note 3, art. 133(5). 
 61 EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133. 
 62 Paavo Lipponen, Prime Minister, Fin., Address at the College of Europe, in Bruges, Belg. 
(Nov. 10, 2000), available at http://www.coleurope.eu/template.asp?pagename=speeches (click 
on “full text” under “Speech by Paavo Lipponen”). 
 63 Finnish Delegation, Meeting Document: Article 133 (SN 526/00, Dec. 10, 2000). 
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services and the commercial aspects of intellectual property.”64  By way of 
derogation, the Treaty of Nice specified that agreements relating to trade in 
cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human 
health services, fell within the “shared competence of the Community and its 
Member States.”65  It prescribed that, in addition to Community 
decisionmaking, the negotiation of such agreements required the common 
accord of the Member States and that they needed to be concluded jointly by 
the Community and the Member States.66  The Treaty of Nice also 
maintained that international agreements in the field of transport would 
continue to be governed by specific provisions outside the CCP.67  The result 
was complex and far from satisfactory to ensure an efficient and effective 
EU voice in international trade diplomacy.68  In the words of Professor 
Christoph Herrmann: “Sisyphus would have done a better job.”69 
D.  The Constitutional Treaty 
The breakthrough came thanks to the new negotiating method devised for 
the creation of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.70  While the 
                                                                                                                   
 64 EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(5).  By way of derogation from the general rule 
that the Council decides on CCP matters by qualified majority voting, Article 133(5) 
specified, however, that the Council had to act unanimously when negotiating and concluding 
an agreement in the fields of trade in services and commercial aspects of intellectual property 
where that agreement included provisions for which unanimity was required for the adoption 
of internal rules or where it related to a field in which the Community had not yet exercised 
the powers conferred upon it by adopting internal rules.  Id. 
 65 Id. art. 133(6). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Marise Cremona, A Policy of Bits and Pieces? The Common Commercial Policy After 
Nice, 4 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 61 (2002); Christoph W. Herrmann, Common 
Commercial Policy After Nice: Sisyphus Would Have Done a Better Job, 39 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 7 (2002); Stefan Griller & Katharina Gamharter, External Trade: Is There a Path 
Through the Maze of Competences?, in EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN 
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 65 (Stefan Griller & Birgit Weidel eds., 2002); Horst Günter 
Krenzler & Christian Pitschas, Progress or Stagnation? The Common Commercial Policy 
After Nice, 6 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 291 (2001); Leal-Arcas, supra note 4, at 362. 
 69 Herrmann, supra note 68, at 7. 
 70 Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. III-315, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. 
(C 310) 1 [hereinafter Constitutional Treaty].  For discussion of the CCP provisions in the 
Constitutional Treaty, see Jean-François Brakeland, Politique Commerciale Commune, 
Coopération Avec les Pays Tiers et Aide Humanitaire, in GENESIS AND DESTINY OF THE 
EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 849–66 (Giuliano Amato et al. eds., 2007); Marise Cremona, The 
Draft Constitutional Treaty: External Relations and External Action, 40 COMMON MKT. L. 
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previous EU Treaties were negotiated largely in secret among diplomats and 
heads of state or government, the Constitutional Treaty was prepared in a 
transparent manner by a European Convention.71  It was composed of 
representatives of the heads of state or government, national parliaments, the 
European Parliament, and the European Commission.72  The Convention’s 
Working Group dealing with external relations approached the issue of CCP 
competences from the angle of decisionmaking efficiency.73  It considered 
the fact that not all areas of trade were subject to qualified majority voting as 
an “oddity” and “an impediment to the Union’s efficiency in multilateral and 
bilateral trade negotiations.”74  It therefore supported the use of qualified 
majority voting in “all areas of commercial policy, including services and 
intellectual property.”75  The Convention’s Praesidium, i.e. the leaders of the 
Convention who guided the drafting process, translated this request by 
simply incorporating trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, as well as foreign direct investment, to the list of policy fields 
falling under the CCP.76  The Convention also added a number of safeguards, 
such as unanimous voting in a number of cases, that were further expanded 
by the Member States in the Intergovernmental Conference that followed the 
Convention.77  However, the general principle that the CCP had to 
incorporate trade in goods and trade in services, the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property, and foreign direct investment, was sealed.78 
                                                                                                                   
REV. 1347, 1361–64 (2003); Angelika Hable, The European Constitution and the Reform of 
External Competences, in EU CONSTITUTIONALISATION: FROM THE CONVENTION TO THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY 2002–2005, at 143, 143, 171–76 (Lenka Rovna & Wolfgang 
Wessels eds., 2006); Bernd Martenczuk, The Constitution for Europe and the External 
Relations of the European Union, in UNDERSTANDING THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION 253, 278–
80 (Servaas van Thiel et al. eds., 2005); Markus Krajewski, External Trade Law and the 
Constitutional Treaty: Towards a Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial 
Policy?, 42 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 91 (2005). 
 71 Youri Devuyst, The Constitutional Treaty and Lisbon, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Erik Jones et al. eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 72 Id. 
 73 Report from Working Group VII, “External Action” to Members of the Convention, Final 
Report of Working Group VII on External Action CONV 459/02, para. 52 (Dec. 16, 2002). 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Note from the Praesidium to the Convention, Draft Articles on External Action in the 
Constitutional Treaty, CONV 685/03, at 52–54 (Apr. 23, 2003). 
 77 Id. at 53–55; Constitutional Treaty, supra note 70, art. III-315. 
 78 Note from the Praesidium to the Convention, supra note 76, at 53. 
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E.  The Treaty of Lisbon 
Since the Constitutional Treaty failed to enter into force, a large part of its 
content was carried over by the Lisbon Treaty effective on December 1, 
2009.79  The relevant Article 207 TFEU on the CCP—which is identical to 
the Constitutional Treaty’s Article III-315—defines its scope in the 
following terms: 
The common commercial policy shall be based on uniform 
principles, particularly with regard to changes in tariff rates, the 
conclusion of tariff and trade agreements relating to trade in 
goods and services, and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, foreign direct investment, the achievement of 
uniformity in measures of liberalisation, export policy and 
measures to protect trade such as those taken in the event of 
dumping or subsidies.80 
Thus, trade in services, the commercial aspects of intellectual property, 
and foreign direct investment are fully integrated in the CCP.81  They remain 
subject, however, to the specific rule that, for the negotiation and conclusion 
of agreements in these three fields, the Council shall act unanimously 
(instead of the ordinary decisionmaking method of qualified majority voting) 
where such agreements include provisions for which unanimity is required 
for the adoption of internal rules.82  This requirement is less stringent than 
the requirement under the Treaty of Nice that imposed unanimity for 
agreements in trade in services and the commercial aspects of intellectual 
                                                                                                                   
 79 Devuyst, supra note 71. 
 80 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(1). 
 81 Marc Bungenberg, Going Global? The EU Common Commercial Policy After Lisbon, 1 
EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 123, 132 (2010); Angelos Dimopoulos, The Common Commercial 
Policy After Lisbon: Establishing Parallelism Between Internal and External Economic 
Relations?, 4 CROATIAN Y.B. EUR. L. & POL. 101, 107–08 (2008); Peter-Christian Müller-
Graff, The Common Commercial Policy Enhanced by the Reform Treaty of Lisbon?, in LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supra note 12, at 188; JEAN-CLAUDE PIRIS, THE 
LISBON TREATY: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 281 (2010); Jan Wouters et al., The 
European Union’s External Relations After the Lisbon Treaty, in THE LISBON TREATY: EU 
CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT A CONSTITUTIONAL TREATY? 144, 170–71 (Stefan Griller & 
Jacques Ziller eds., 2008). 
 82 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(4). 
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property relating to a field in which the Community had not yet exercised its 
powers by adopting internal rules.83 
1. The CCP Extended to Trade in Services and the Commercial Aspects 
of Intellectual Property 
With respect to the scope of trade in services, it is safe to conclude that all 
four GATS modes of supply are now entirely covered by the CCP.84  In 
Opinion 1/08, the Court indirectly confirmed this viewpoint when dismissing 
a Spanish submission that the concept of trade in services would not cover all 
GATS modes of supply.85  The Court added in particular that “given both its 
general nature and the fact that it was concluded at world level, the GATS 
assumes, as regards in particular the concept of ‘trade in 
services’ . . . particular importance in the sphere of international action 
relating to trade in services.”86  By analogy, it must be assumed that the CCP 
coverage of commercial aspects of intellectual property encompasses the 
entire TRIPs Agreement.87  That the Court looks to the GATS as of 
“particular” importance in interpreting the scope of the CCP concept of trade 
in services gives the CCP a dynamic nature (since the scope of the GATS 
itself may evolve as a function of the negotiations at the WTO).  Again, the 
same reasoning should apply to the relationship between TRIPs and the CCP 
concept of commercial aspects of intellectual property.  Furthermore, as the 
key aim of the inclusion of trade in services and the commercial aspects of 
intellectual property in the CCP was to increase the EU’s efficiency and 
effectiveness in the negotiation and conclusion of future agreements covering 
GATS and TRIPs, it is justified and appropriate to give a dynamic, and not a 
static, interpretation to the new Treaty provisions.88  
In contrast with the Treaty of Nice, the CCP after the Lisbon Treaty also 
fully includes trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, 
                                                                                                                   
 83 EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(5). 
 84 Bungenberg, supra note 81, at 132; Dimopoulos, supra note 81, at 107–08; Markus 
Krajewski, Of Modes and Sectors: External Relations, Internal Debates, and the Special Case 
of (Trade in) Services, in DEVELOPMENTS IN EU EXTERNAL RELATIONS LAW, supra note 18, at 
172, 193–94; PIRIS, supra note 81, at 281; Wouters et al., supra note 81, at 170–71. 
 85 Opinion 1/08, 2009 E.C.R. I-11129, para. 120.  
 86 Id. para. 121; Marise Cremona, Balancing Union and Member State Interests: Opinion 
1/2008, Choice of Legal Base and the Common Commercial Policy Under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, 35 EUR. L. REV. 678, 683–84 (2010). 
 87 Dimopoulos, supra note 81, at 108; PIRIS, supra note 81, at 281. 
 88 Dimopoulos, supra note 81, at 109. 
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and social and human health services.89  The Lisbon Treaty provides that the 
Council shall act unanimously (instead of through the ordinary qualified 
majority voting procedure) for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements: 
(a) in the field of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, 
where these agreements risk prejudicing the Union’s cultural 
and linguistic diversity; and (b) in the field of trade in social, 
education and health services, where these agreements risk 
seriously disturbing the national organization of such services 
and prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver 
them.90 
2.  The CCP Extended to Foreign Direct Investment 
While the post-Lisbon definition of trade in services and commercial 
aspects of intellectual property is relatively straightforward, attempts to 
circumscribe the scope of the concept of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the CCP context has given rise to a greater variety of opinions.91  In contrast 
with the commercial aspects of intellectual property, there is no explicit 
requirement that FDI should be trade-related.92  While legal scholars disagree 
on which types of investment measures fall within the CCP’s scope, the 
European Commission has published a helpful Communication that clarifies 
its official understanding of the new FDI competences.93  For the 
Commission, FDI “is generally considered to include any foreign investment 
                                                                                                                   
 89 EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, art. 133(6); Krajewski, supra note 84, at 194. 
 90 TFEU, supra note 2, art. 207(4). 
 91 Marc Bungenberg, The Division of Competences Between the EU and Its Member States 
in the Area of Investment Politics, EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 29 (2011); Bungenberg, supra 
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2011) (unpublished Master Thesis in International and European Law, Vrije Universiteit 
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 92 Martenczuk, supra note 70, at 278–79; Wouters et al., supra note 81, at 171–73.  For a 
more restrictive opinion, see Krajewski, supra note 70, at 114. 
 93 Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy COM (2010) 343 
final (July 7, 2010). 
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which serves to establish lasting and direct links with the undertaking to 
which capital is made available in order to carry out an economic activity.”94  
When FDI takes the form of shareholding, this presupposes for the 
Commission “that the shares enable the shareholder to participate effectively 
in the management of that company or in its control.”95  The Commission 
agrees with most legal analysts that this contrasts with portfolio investments 
of a short-term and sometimes speculative nature, where there is no intention 
to influence the management or control of the undertaking.96  
Since portfolio investments do not come under the EU’s exclusive CCP 
competence, legal experts like Marc Bungenberg have drawn the conclusion 
that the EU would be able to conclude pure EU investment agreements based 
on the CCP’s explicit exclusive competence only “if these agreements solely 
cover pre- and post-establishment regulation but have no provisions on 
protection, dispute resolution and expropriation with regard to portfolio 
investments.”97  However, most bilateral investment treaties (BITs) cover 
both FDI and portfolio investments.98  Bungenberg therefore fears that the 
new CCP competence might not meet the demands of EU investors and 
negotiating partners for the conclusion of comprehensive BITs.99  Other 
scholars have thus suggested that full EU BITs be based on a combination of 
explicit and implicit EU treaty-making powers.100  In this construction, the 
EU’s implicit treaty-making competence over portfolio investment flows 
from the existing TFEU provisions that, as a general principle, prohibit 
restrictions on the free movement of capital and payments between Member 
States and third countries.101  
                                                                                                                   
 94 Id. at 2. 
 95 Id. at 2–3. 
 96 Id. at 3.  For a similar perspective, see Bungenberg, supra note 91, at 41; Bungenberg, 
supra note 81, at 144; Dimopoulos, supra note 81, at 110; Herrmann, supra note 91, at 3; 
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The European Commission’s own approach is similar.102 Calling for a 
comprehensive EU international investment policy, the Commission points 
out that the Treaty’s prohibition on capital and payment restrictions covers 
both direct and portfolio investments.103  While recognizing that the Treaty’s 
Chapter on capital and payments does not expressly provide for the 
possibility to conclude international agreements on investment, the 
Commission underlines that the exclusive EU competence to conclude 
agreements in this area is implied to the extent that international agreements 
on investment would affect the scope of the common rules set by the 
Treaty’s Chapter in question.104  In this context, the Commission refers to the 
new TFEU Article 3(2) which provides:  
The Union shall also have exclusive competence for the 
conclusion of an international agreement when its conclusion is 
provided for in a legislative act of the Union or is necessary to 
enable the Union to exercise its internal competence, or in so 
far as its conclusion may affect common rules or alter their 
scope.105  
The Commission’s viewpoint seemed to have been well received by EU’s 
Trade Policy Committee, consisting of senior trade policy experts of the 
Member States.106  It proposed that the EU’s Council of Ministers would 
explicitly acknowledge the importance of the Commission’s comprehensive 
approach to shaping the future EU international investment policy.107  
Furthermore, it recommended that the Council would expressly support “the 
definition of a broad scope for the new EU policy in this field as suggested 
by the Commission.”108  The door for further discussion was not, however, 
closed as the Trade Policy Committee also stated that the definition of the 
broad scope was “to be further elaborated in full respect of the respective 
                                                                                                                   
 102 Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment Policy, supra note 93, at 8. 
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 104 Id. 
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competences of the Union and its Member States as defined by the 
Treaties.”109 
3.  The CCP and the Exclusion of Transport Policy 
The Lisbon Treaty did not alter the fact that the negotiation and 
conclusion of international agreements in the field of transport remains 
outside of the CCP and subject to the specific rules contained in the Treaty 
Title on transport.110  Clarifying the scope of this exception, the Court held in 
Opinion 1/08 that “there is no doubt that the expression ‘international 
agreements in the field of transport’ covers, inter alia, the field of trade 
concerning transport services.”111  In Opinion 1/08, the Court also rejected 
the arguments of the Commission and Parliament that the exclusion of 
agreements in transport from the scope of the CCP should apply only in the 
case of agreements that are exclusively, or at the very least predominantly, 
concerned with transport.112  The Commission and Parliament argued that 
CCP provisions formed the appropriate legal base where provisions on 
transport have a merely ancillary or secondary nature within trade 
agreements.113  For the Court, such an interpretation could not be accepted, 
notably because it would to a large extent deprive the transport exception 
provision of its effectiveness.114 
4.  The Implementation of CCP Agreements and the Internal Delimitation 
of EU Competences and Powers 
The final paragraph of Article 207 TFEU includes the important 
limitation that the implementation of the CCP may not affect the delimitation 
of the EU’s (internal) competences and powers.115  It reads as follows: 
 The exercise of the competences conferred by this Article in 
the field of the common commercial policy shall not affect the 
delimitation of competences between the Union and the 
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Member States, and shall not lead to harmonisation of 
legislative or regulatory provisions of the Member States in so 
far as the Treaties exclude such harmonisation.116 
At first sight, this provision could be interpreted as prohibiting the 
adoption of external measures under the CCP that would (a) go beyond 
measures that have been or could be adopted on the basis of internal EU 
competences; and (b) go into areas where internal harmonization is 
excluded.117  This interpretation does not, however, sufficiently take into 
account the new context of external competence under the Treaty of 
Lisbon.118  
First, Article 207(6) cannot be interpreted as establishing a parallelism 
between internal and external competences in the sense of the Court’s 
restrictive application of the implied external powers doctrine in Opinion 
1/94.119  As Jan Wouters, Dominic Coppens, and Bart De Meester have 
correctly underlined, Article 207(6) concerns only the CCP and this is an 
area governed by explicit exclusive external competence, even in the absence 
of existing internal measures.120  
Second, as Markus Krajewski has convincingly demonstrated, Article 
207(6) cannot be logically interpreted as prohibiting the adoption of external 
measures under the CCP that would go into sectors where internal 
harmonization is excluded.121  Such an interpretation would contradict the 
explicit inclusion, in the CCP, of such sectors as cultural, educational, and 
health services (where such internal harmonization is excluded).122  
Third, Article 207(6) has meaning when it is interpreted “to delimit the 
external from the internal sphere” and “to prevent the exclusive character of 
                                                                                                                   
 116 Id.  This provision corresponds to a certain degree, but is not identical in meaning, to the 
formulation in Article 133(6) of the EC Treaty (Nice), supra note 13, that stipulated: “An 
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 118 Hable, supra note 70, at 174; Krajewski, supra note 84, at 194; Wouters et al., supra note 
81, at 173. 
 119 Opinion 1/94, 1994, E.C.R., I-5267, VIII.  
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 121 Krajewski, supra note 84, at 194. 
 122 Id. 
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the powers under the CCP encroaching upon the internal delimitation of 
competences.”123  Without the limitation of Article 207(6), the EU might—
via the need to implement CCP agreements in, for example, services—gain 
competence to legislate in cultural, educational, and health services.124  
Article 207(6) is therefore a limitation on the internal implementation of 
CCP agreements.  Krajewski has fittingly reformulated the provision as 
follows: “The Union can only implement international agreements insofar as 
it enjoys internal legislative competence.  In other areas, the Union has to 
rely on the Member States to implement international agreements.”125  
Even in those areas where the implementation of CCP agreements is the 
competence of the Member States, the coherent application of such 
agreements concluded by the EU is ensured by (a) the fact that agreements 
concluded by the Union are binding on its Member States;126 (b) the 
obligation of the Member States to ensure fulfillment of the obligations 
resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union, such as international 
agreements;127 and (c) the primacy of EU law over the law of the Member 
States.128 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
After several decades of political and legal struggle, the Treaty of Lisbon 
has provided the EU with a primary law base that finally settled the question 
of the inclusion of trade in services, commercial aspects of intellectual 
property, and foreign direct investment in the CCP.129  Although the Treaty 
of Lisbon thus constitutes a major breakthrough for the EU’s position as 
negotiator of international trade agreements, the preceding paragraphs have 
shown that it not did put an end to the legal discussions on the scope of the 
CCP.  The precise definition of the terms “trade in services,” “commercial 
aspects of intellectual property,” and especially “foreign direct investment” 
will most likely be the subject of further debate and court cases.  
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Furthermore, important legal questions will continue to arise on (a) the 
precise delimitation of the CCP in relation to other EU policy fields such as 
environment and general foreign and security policy; and (b) the choice of 
legal bases for conclusions by the EU of multi-purpose agreements that 
involve trade provisions, in addition to other objectives.  Space constraints, 
unfortunately, made it impossible to go into these issues in the framework of 
this Article.130  It must be noted, however, that—much like the Court’s 
general approach to external competences—its case law on the delimitation 
of the CCP in relation to other policy domains has not been a major 
contribution to creating legal certainty and clarity in a longer-term 
perspective.131 
In its Opinion 1/08, the Court recalled that concerns “relating to the need 
for unity and rapidity of external action and to the difficulties that might arise 
were the Community and the Member States to participate jointly in 
conclusion of the agreements at issue cannot change the answer to the 
question of competence.”132  In other words, the Court cannot be relied upon 
to settle fundamental issues of efficiency and effectiveness of EU trade 
policy.  This is a matter for the Member States (and the EU institutions) to 
work out in political agreements.  Unfortunately, as Judge Christiaan 
Timmermans observed, “[s]ometimes, one gets the impression that in 
external affairs, Member States founded the Community to contest its 
competences rather than to exercise them.”133  In this respect, the EU’s 
competence battles on the CCP are an illustration of the constant struggle 
between the general interest of the Union and the welfare of its population as 
a whole and the narrowly defined, short-term self-interests of the Member 
States.  At the same time, the history of the CCP also shows that, as in most 
other EU policy fields, Europe’s long-term evolution is one that follows the 
rational road of integration. 
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